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Abstract
We study the consequences of broader access to credit and capitalmarkets on household decisions
over the number of children. A model of the net reproduction rate is estimated on data from 78
countries over the period 1995–2010. Liquidity constraints are approximated by private credit
and household credit, while opportunities for financial investment are measured by the domes-
tic public debt. We use the Index of Financial Liberalisation (Abiad et al., 2009) as one of the
instruments for the financial variables. We find that improved access to credit increases fertility
with an elasticity of around 30%, while the effect of the development of capitalmarkets is negative
( 10%). The regression model takes the role of social security into account. Quantile regression
shows that our results are robust to outliers and parameter heterogeneity.
JEL Codes: D1, J13, G1.
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1 Introduction
Fertility behaviour and financial development have seen dramatic changes in recent decades, both
showing distinctive patterns: as financial development spreads worldwide, enhancing the possi-
bility of credit and intertemporal trade for households and firms, fertility shows a clear downward
trendwhich is cause for concern, especially in developed countries whichwill be facing decreasing
populations in the near future.
Do these two phenomena simply show a spurious temporal correlation or does one cause the
other? Financial development may be one of the driving forces that change fertility behaviour.
Raising children requires a significant transfer of parents’ resources in the children’s favour, which
may be driven not only by altruism, but also by the expectation that some resources will be re-
turned during the parents’ old age: this exchange is not synchronous and requires coordination
of individual actions that can be best achieved by means of specialised institutions. Since the ba-
sic function of financial markets is to facilitate intertemporal trade, making current consumption
less dependent on current income, better organised and diversified financial markets would make
such transfers easier and induce parents to have more children. Nevertheless, the development of
financial markets reduces the demand for children for the purpose of receiving old age support.
The impact of financial development on fertility is therefore undetermined and should be assessed
empirically.
A glimpse at the figures involved can give an idea of the radical change that has taken place.
At the world level, the fertility rate, i.e., the average number of children per woman over her life-
time, dropped from 4.91 in 1960–1965 to 2.56 in 2005–2008, with large differences between
country groups. While more developed regions recorded a decrease from 2.67 to 1.64, the rate in
less developed countries has declined from 6.73 to 4.39.1 Unlike fertility, financial development
is a multifaceted phenomenon; many of its indicators also reveal a similarly striking trend. For
example, the ratio of private credit to GDP has risen from 0.39 to 1.14 in high income countries
and from 0.13 to 0.31 in LDCs. Similar patterns are followed by other financial variables whose
values measure the breadth of opportunities for financial investment.2
The transition from high to low fertility has been analysed in depth in the fields of economics
and demography. In the literature, the onset of a demographic transition is often ascribed to the
rise in income and education and to the reduction in mortality (Galor (2012), surveys the litera-
ture). Indeed, increasing income brings about both the rise in the opportunity cost of raising chil-
dren and an income effect which implies greater investment in the education of fewer children.
Since the demographic transition often occurred during periods of sustained economic growth, it
is argued that technological progress increased the incentive for human capital investment, caus-
ing a decline in fertility. Another important phenomenon that accompanied the fertility transi-
tion was the significant reduction in infant mortality. Whatever is the reason for having children,
lower mortality should allow a smaller number of births.
Although other causes of the demographic transition have been investigated, to date no com-
prehensive analysis of the role of financial development has been performed.3 The objective of
this paper is to produce general and reliable evidence on the effects of borrowing constraints and
opportunities for financial investment on the choice of the number of children.
1The figures on fertility rates are accessible at http://data.un.org/.
2The figures on financial structure are accessible atWorld Bank website and at Ross Levine’s personal website.
3Cigno and Rosati (1992) investigate the effects of household access to capital markets on fertility in Italy, finding
empirical support for a negative effect. Some evidence on this issue comes from the literature onmicrocredit programmes:
these studies show some controversial effects of increased financial availability on fertility. Nonetheless, such financial
empowerment programmes are generally aimed at very poor people living in LDCs; accordingly, the external validity of
these studies is questionable.
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To elucidate the channels through which financial development affects fertility, we introduce
a four-period life-cycle model of choice in which fertility is endogenous and the household cares
for its children and for its parents too. In this setting young adults might choose to borrow some
resources and, when older, to save and invest in the capital market. We assume two main types
of imperfections of financial markets (Pollin, 1997; McKinnon, 1973): borrowing constraints –
the difficulties encountered by individuals when trying to reach their optimal level of debt – and
saving constraints, which pertain to the uneasiness encountered by individuals who wish to invest
their savings in a private financial market. We show that in the context of fertility determina-
tion, this distinction has both theoretical relevance and a significant empirical counterpart. The
model shows that the effect of relaxing the borrowing constraint on fertility depends on: (1) an
investment effect, whose positive sign is due to the reduction of future resources and to a cor-
responding greater investment in children, and (2) an income effect. Hence, when children are
normal goods in a household’s preferences, fertility will unambiguously increase. Broader access
to capital markets allows parents to rely less on children to fund their old age welfare. Nonethe-
less, larger savings imply lower debt in the early years of adulthood: in this case the household will
command a smaller amount of resources for consumption and children. Both effects imply that
fertility decreases with greater opportunities for financial investment.4
In the econometric analysis we use a panel of 78 countries over the period 1995–2010 built
by merging the data on fertility, social and economic indicators with those that describe the level
of financial development and structure. Household access to the credit market is approximated
by two variables: the ratio of private credit to GDP and the ratio of household credit to GDP.
To capture the opportunities for financial investment we use the ratio of domestic public debt to
GDP. Government bonds are characterised by low risk and significant supply even in economies
where more sophisticated forms of financial investment are scant. Confirmation of this picture
comes fromdata produced byBeck et al. (2010)who show that themarket capitalization of public
bonds has figures comparable with those of private bonds and stocks or life insurance premiums.
One of themain challenges we faced in the econometric analysis was the possible endogeneity
of financial variables in the fertility equation. Demographic variables such as age are known to be
important determinants of wealth allocation in the life cycle and of risk-taking attitudes. These
effects would seriously undermine any attempt to estimate the causal effect of financial develop-
ment on fertility. Here our approach is to apply instrumental variable methods. Indeed, we use
the Index of Financial Liberalisation produced by Abiad et al. (2009) as instrumental variable for
credit and saving availability.5 This index focuses on financial markets andmeasures the extent of
liberalisation with respect to credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, en-
try barriers, state ownership, policies on securities markets and banking regulations. It records the
evolution of the institutions that directly and indirectly affect the development of financial mar-
kets. Reasonably, since most of this change is due to policy interventions, it should be considered
exogenous with respect to the dynamics of fertility.
Our empirical results indicate that both borrowing constraints and investment opportunities
impact fertility, yet in opposite directions, as predicted by the theory. The estimate of the elasticity
of net fertility to private credit is positive and its value is around 32 per cent. The econometric
results are confirmed when we use a better proxy of household borrowing constraints: the value
of total claims of deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP provided by Beck et al.
4Themodel characterises the main relations between financial markets and fertility choice which guide the economet-
ric analysis, but it does not provide a general equilibrium interpretation of the phenomenon which would deal with the
endogeneity of the financial system. Such a model would greatly complicate the analysis and is beyond the scope of the
paper. However, in the econometric model we take into account the possible endogeneity of the proxies for borrowing and
saving constraints.
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(2012) for a cross-section of 44 countries over the period 1994-2005. Using this variable in error
components 2SLS regressions we find that the elasticity of net fertility to household credit takes
values in the interval 0.2-0.3. The effect of domestic public debt on fertility can be quantifiedwith
an elasticity that takes negative values close to 12 per cent. These results were obtained with the
estimation of a model that includes a proxy for the pension system, which is an alternative to the
financial market in the allocation of saving. Robustness of the econometric results to the presence
of outliers and to possible heterogeneity of the parameters across countries was checked by the
estimation of a panel quantile regression. The results significantly confirm and reinforce the rest
of our estimates. Quantile regression also highlights a stronger effect of borrowing in high fertility
countries.
The full set of estimates highlights the importance of financial development for the explana-
tion of fertility across the world. Indeed, the estimated elasticities take values comparable with
those of other fundamental variables. The net effect of financial variables is positive since credit
availability increases fertility much more than access to capital markets reduces it. Hence, our
econometric analysis suggests financial development acted to curb the declining trend in repro-
duction which we observe in recent decades across the world.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the theoretical and
empirical literature on the impact of financial variables on fertility; Section 3 describes the model
determining household intertemporal allocation of income and fertility determination; Section 4
describes the empirical implementation of the theoretical model, specification and identification
issues, the data used for estimation and the relative results; Section 5 discusses policy implications
and concludes.
2 Literature review
In the economic literature, fertility behaviour is driven by selfish or altruistic motivations: adults
can invest in children as an alternative to financial investment and public pension, or derive plea-
sure from children as durable consumption goods; alternatively, parents can be altruistic and car-
ing about their children’s well-being.
The models of the first type date back to the pioneering contribution of Leibenstein (1957)
in which children, rather than being net consumers of family resources, actually increase their
families’ lifetime wealth. Although infants are completely dependent upon their family for their
personal consumption, as they grow up they become capable of working and transferring income
back to their families. As long as the value of resources returned by grown-up children exceeds
the value of resources consumed as infants, fertility is a financially profitable trade from the stand-
points of parents and children.
Cigno (1993) analyses themodel of an extended family where members are selfish and follow
some self-enforcing family rules according to which the parents lend to the children and are paid
back in old age. Hence, the family is a substitute for the financial market. When the demand for
children depends on financial returns, the availability of alternative assets becomes crucial. When
financial markets start providing assets which offer high returns, some families would drop fertil-
ity as an investment and turn to the market as the return on financial assets exceeds the return on
children. This hypothesis of complete substitutability between children and financial assets may
be found in the development economics literature (Willis, 1980; Schultz, 1974; Neher, 1971)
and suggests that better access to financial markets and investment opportunities would invari-
ably lead to a decrease in planned fertility. Nonetheless, Razin and Sadka (1995) have shown that
in a general equilibrium analysis financial deepening does not necessarily carry a drop in fertility.
Introducing heterogeneity in preferences and technologies, as well as the basic equilibrium iden-
tity between aggregate saving and aggregate borrowing, financial trade opportunities allow some
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families to invest more in market assets and less in fertility, but at the same time other families
must do the opposite, thus increasing fertility. The net balance between these competing forces
may result in higher overall fertility.
A different and complementary view of the relation between financial development and fertil-
ity choice arises frommodels where it is generally assumed that parents are interested in children
per se (Hotz et al., 1997; Becker and Barro, 1988; Willis, 1973; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker,
1960) and may find it profitable to borrow against the future in order to finance their children’s
consumption and investment in human capital. In this case, financial deepening and credit con-
sumption availability may induce an increase in fertility.
The empirical literature provides just a few inquiries into this topic. Cigno and Rosati (1996)
develop a model of joint determination of fertility and saving in which fertility behaviour can be
driven by two mutually exclusive reasons: altruism or selfishness. In the first case, altruism in the
utility function runs either backwards, from parents to children, or forwards from children to
parents. In the second case, the impossibility of intertemporal trade and the decreasing value of
human capital across time make fertility the only available technology for saving for the old age.
Using cointegration analysis on time series data forGermany, Italy, UK andUSA, the authors find
evidence compatible with the selfish motivation for fertility.
Cigno andRosati (1992), employing cointegration analysis on Italian data, documents a nega-
tive effect of capital market accessibility on fertility in the long-run. The variable selected to proxy
for financial development is the inverse of the ratio of currency held by the non-bank public to
bank deposits. Boldrin et al. (2005) calibrate a model of fertility with social security and finan-
cial market imperfections to reproduce the USA economy in 2000. They find that the elasticity
of fertility to better access to capital markets is negative and significant. An alternative model
by Scotese Lehr (1999) finds that financial intermediation can influence fertility in an indirect
fashion. In an economy with two sectors – a traditional one with low capitalization and a mod-
ern one with high capitalization – an increase in the level of financial intermediation lowers the
cost of capital, driving up wages in the modern sector. Households then reduce fertility as their
members shift labour supply from the labour-intensive sector to the capital-intensive sector. Em-
ploying a reduced-form VARmodel with panel data on 87 countries from 1965 to 1980, Scotese
Lehr finds that two measures of the extent of financial intermediation Granger-cause a drop in
fertility. Specifically, the estimated elasticity of fertility with regard to the ratio of money to GDP
is 7:7% and the elasticity with regard to the ratio of private credit to GDP is 5:7%.
The link between financial empowerment of women and fertility is also a subject of investi-
gation in the literature on evaluation of microcredit programs, although in this regard the em-
pirical evidence is inconclusive. Since most of such programmes target women, the additional fi-
nancial resources provided tend to shift individual effort from childbearing to income-generating
activities. At the same time, the wealth effect can increase the demand for children when these
are normal goods. For example, some econometric studies of the Grameen Bank programme in
Bangladesh (Steele et al., 2001; Schuler and Hashemi, 1994) observe an increased use of contra-
ceptives resulting in lower fertility, while others (Pitt et al., 1999; Schuler et al., 1997) find that
the impact of the same programme on contraceptive use is in fact negligible.
The literature surveyed in this section, while offering several competing perspectives onhouse-
holds’ fertility behavior, so far has not provided a general framework for its analysis in the con-
text of imperfect capital markets. More specifically, previous contributions failed to distinguish
between borrowing constraints and limited access to capital markets (saving constraints). Though
interlinked, these imperfections have distinctive features and differential effects on fertility. Bor-
rowing constraints refer to the inability of households to receive their optimal level of loans from
thefinancial sector: in this case, the observed level of households’ debt is lower thanoptimal. Con-
versely, saving constraints refer to the insufficient ability of the financial sector to collect savings
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from households: in this case, it is the level of savings to be suboptimal, since its financial return
is constrained to be too low. These two types of imperfections have different impact along the
life cycle, as typically young families are net borrowers, whereas mature families are net lenders:
accordingly, rational forward-looking fertility decisions must account for both imperfections. In
what followswe aim to show that this overlooked distinction is crucial to understand the complex
link between financial markets and households’ fertility behavior.
3 Theory
The model represents the choices of a household over the life cycle as determined by altruistic
relations in the family and by the trading relations with financial markets. We model intergen-
erational altruism assuming that parents care about the well-being of their children and their
parents. Adults care about consumption of their children and fund it with transfers; similarly,
grown-up children make gifts to their parents to sustain their old age consumption. This theoret-
ical approach to altruistic preferences (Becker, 1974; Andreoni, 1989) is fairly general and widely
adopted in the literature on the demand for children (Boldrin and Jones, 2002; Wigger, 1999;
Nishimura and Zhang, 1992; Ehrlich and Lui, 1991; Eckstein andWolpin, 1985).
The time sequences of household expenditure and income over the life cycle imply the need to
borrow resources in the first years of adulthood and the incentive to save and invest in the capital
market later on. Capitalmarkets can be perfect, meaning that households can borrow and save the
optimal amounts consistent with their intertemporal budget constraint. Several forms of imper-
fections, nonetheless, may limit credit availability to households with significant consequences
on their decisions. Similarly, opportunities for financial investment can be scarce in economies
where property rights are not well enforced and informational asymmetries between lenders and
borrowers are severe. This situation has been termed a savings constraint in the literature (Pollin,
1997) and refers to the adverse role on savings played by a low level of financial deepening (McK-
innon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). In this case, investing in children is an alternative to poor financial
market conditions.
In what follows, for expository convenience, we first present the model with perfect financial
markets, and then we turn to the distinct cases of borrowing constraints and limited access to
capital markets. Though real economies often present both types of market imperfections, this
expository strategy affords a better understanding of the consequences of each kind of market
failure on fertility choice.
3.1 Timing and budget constraints
A household lives for four periods: it is young in the first, young adult in the second, adult in
the third, and old in the fourth. Children are born during their parents’ young adulthood and
neither work nor have resources; they live with their parents who spend some resources to rear
them. Young adults work and take care of their nt children during the first period of adulthood;
they still work when adult and take care of their old parents; they retire when old. The choice
problem starts in the second period of life and spans the three remaining periods. The life-cycle
utility function of a household member who is a young adult at date t is:
U = v
 
c1t ; nt

+ u
 
c2t+1; c
3
t+1

+ g
 
c3t+2

; (1)
where superscript denotes the period of life (0; 1; 2; 3), c1t is consumptionduring early adulthood,
nt is the number of children, c2t+1 is consumption during late adulthood, c3t+2 is consumption
during old age, and c3t+1 is consumption of the parents during their own old age. The functions
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v(), u(), g() are strictly concave and satisfy Inada conditions. Assuming that household utility
is increasing in each argument, two of them represent altruism in the family: children (nt) and
old parents’ consumption (c3t+1), implying forward and backward altruism, respectively.6
During eachperiod, choices are constrainedby intertemporal and intratemporal requirements
according to the following schedule:
• In the second period of their life (1) agents become adult and start working, get married,
become parents, and use debt to finance their consumption and the cost of their children
which includes consumption andother expenditures (e.g., education, health); theymay face
borrowing constraints. The budget constraint is:
c1t = (1  nt)w1t +Dt (2)
where  is the cost of raising one child as a share of the labour income, w1t , andDt is the
amount of debt.
• In the third period (2) parents keep working, pay back their debt, and save for their own
old age. In addition, they support their parents by transferring money to them. At the
beginning of the same period, the children leave parental house and start working. The
budget constraint is:
c2t+1 = w
2
t+1  Rt+1Dt   qt+1   st+1 (3)
where w2t+1 is labour income, Rt+1  1 + rt+1 and rt+1 is the interest rate, qt+1 is a
money transfer towards parents, and st+1 is the value of saving.
During the same time period the agent’s parents face the following budget constraint:
c3t+1 = Rt+1st + nt 1qt+1 (4)
where qt+1 is the amount of transfers received by the parents from each child.
• In the fourth period (3) agents do not work because of their old age. They live on payments
from previous financial investments and possibly from transfers from their children. The
budget constraint is
c3t+2 = Rt+2st+1 + ntqt+2 (5)
where qt+2 is the amount of transfers received by parents from each child.
3.2 The optimal choice
The young adult optimisation programme consists in maximising the utility function (1) with
respect to life-cycle consumption, the number of children, and parents’ consumption, subject to
the budget constraints (2)-(5). Following the literature (e.g., Lagerlöf (1997); Nishimura and
Zhang (1992)), we assume the household maximises the utility function, taking the future deci-
sions of the children as given. The optimality conditions characterise the trade-off between the
household’s consumption in different ages. The adult also chooses the gift for her/his parent by
equating the marginal increase of utility she/he derives from greater parent’s consumption to the
marginal utility cost, which is equally shared with siblings. Similarly, the optimal choice of the
number of children follows from the balance between themarginal cost of a child in terms of util-
ity and two marginal benefits: the first derives from greater child consumption and the second
6Altruistic parents take care of both the number and consumption of children. We simplify the analysis assuming that
child consumption is given exogenous. The assumption of an exogenously given fixed cost per child is a standard in the
literature.
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from the increase in parent’s future consumption due to financial support.7 By the same token,
household optimal choices imply that the gross rate of return on children – the ratio between the
value of the gift divided by the cost of a child net of the benefit in terms of current consumption
– is equal to the rate of return on financial investment:
qt+2
w1t   @v/@nt@v/@c1t
= Rt+1Rt+2: (6)
Themodel accounts for some of themost important features of adult life and highlights how they
are affected by the financial markets. When these markets work perfectly, the optimal decisions
of the parents can be fully realized. In this respect, further insights come from the comparative
statics of nt with respect to some of the most important parameters. Proofs of the results are in
the appendix.
The comparative statics effect of wages on fertility can be split into two parts. The first repre-
sents the cost of children and is negative. The second part is a combination between the standard
income effect (positive when children are normal goods) and the negative effect of income on the
decision to invest in children. Greater support from the children to the parents has two effects on
fertility: qt+2 increases nt since it modifies the trade-off between marginal benefit and marginal
cost of fertility by increasing the return from investing in children, while the same change in qt+2
has income effects which are similar to those already discussed.
An increase in the interest rate has several effects on nt. As the financial alternative to invest-
ment in children yields a higher return, fertility becomes more costly. In addition, the household
faces stronger incentives to shift expenditure from current items, c1t ; nt, to the future, c2t+1, c3t+1,
c3t+2. The income effect of the interest rate depends on the net financial position of the house-
hold, which can borrow more than the amount it saves, or just the opposite. The resulting effect
depends on the balance between the two income effects we identified in the discussion of the
effect of wages on fertility.
Now, suppose that households cannot borrow against the future the desired amount of re-
sources, since they undergo rationing in financial markets. This additional constraint prevents
expenditure on children and consumption of young adults from exceeding the total amount of
resources available during the first period of adulthood:
c1t = (1  nt)w1t +Dt (7)
whereDt is the highest amount of resources that can be borrowed, exogenously given. The first
order conditions for this problem resemble those found in the case without borrowing constraint.
As shown in appendix, the influence ofw1t onnt can be interpreted in terms of income and cost of
children effects as in the case of perfect markets. The same can be said of the comparative statics
effect of the gift qt+2 on nt. If the gift from each child increases, then parents can obtain the
desired old-age consumption by raising fewer children.
Higher credit availability will impact on household fertility according to two causal effects.
As the value ofD grows -more credit is available to households - youngparents command a greater
amount of their future resources, and spend these resources on consumption and children. Since
children are normal goods in household preferences then nt will increase. Furthermore, the same
increase inDmeans less income available for consumption during retirement. Hence, the house-
7With regard to the trade-off between private consumption and fertility at time t, we assume that w1t >
qt+2/(Rt+1Rt+2), i.e., that child rearing costs are large enough to forbid annihilation of consumption. This conditions
obtains an internally significant solution for fertility (nt <1).
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hold will react by increasing investment in children, i.e., raising the number of childrennt.8 Both
effects imply the sign of dnt dDt is positive.
Since children can also provide support for their retired parents, fertility becomes crucial in
determining the optimal amount of saving. We analyse the model of household choice by assum-
ing that the optimal desired value of saving st+1 is higher than the ceiling st+1. Hence, adults
face the following constraint:
c3t+2 = Rt+2st+1 + ntqt+2; (8)
which shows that both financial investment and children contribute to ensure old age consump-
tion. When the savings constraint is binding while household borrowing is not restricted, the life
cycle utility maximisation programme highlights the consequences of greater access to financial
investment.
Again, the analysis of the effects of labour income on fertility can follow the lines of the pre-
ceding cases. The same can be said of the effects of qt+2 andR on nt. According to comparative
statics, fertility decreases with st+1. Indeed, there is a trade-off between the investment in chil-
dren and that in financial activities since greater financial investment opportunities reduce the
need to raise children for old age consumption. Furthermore, given the intertemporal budget
constraint, when st+1 increases, young adults reduce their debt. As a result, their resources will
be lower and fertility will drop.
In summary, our model suggests that improved access to credit induces households to have
more children, while fertility unambiguously decreases with easier access to capital markets.9 In
the following, we search for econometric evidence consistent with these predictions of themodel.
4 Empirical analysis
The econometric exercise is carried out to find evidence for an economically significant impact of
financial markets on fertility behaviour. In our estimates we use an unbalanced panel of five-year
time series covering the period 1995–2010 for a maximum number of countries equal to 78. We
first introduce our empirical specification, then turn to data description, and finally show various
estimates along with some robustness checks.
4.1 Model specification
Our theoretical model predicts that desired fertility should be responsive, in opposite directions,
both to borrowing constraints and to opportunities to access the capital markets. This feature is
peculiar to our approach, since the literature does not distinguish between different sources of
imperfections in financial markets.
The focus of our analysis is the number of surviving children, and the dependent variable of
the econometric model should correctly approximate for desired fertility. In many countries in-
fant/child mortality is not negligible, and may cause a significant difference between the num-
ber of births and the number of surviving children. In this respect, the use of the total fertility
8If themodel allowed for the quantity/quality trade-off, the parent could react to less resources during old age reducing
fertility and investing more in the education of her children. This extension of the model would greatly complicate the
derivation of comparative statics results. In any case, the negative effect on fertility due to greater child education does not
imply a reversion of the positive sign of the overall effect of credit availability on fertility.
9Our model does not consider the case for bequests from parents to children. This extension of the model would not
change the sign of the effect of released credit constraints on the young adult resources, hence on fertility. However, it
would imply that the old age security hypothesis does not hold for obvious reasons. The resulting model would miss an
important part of the explanation of fertility trends in the world.
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rate should be accompanied by the inclusion of child mortality among the explanatory variables.
However, mortality variables are generally considered endogenous to fertility. The literature on
the effect of child mortality on fertility deals with endogeneity with the selection of instrumental
variables useful to reduce the bias in parameter estimates. However, the search is arduous and
there is no broad agreement on the proposed instrumental variables. Furthermore, the role of
child mortality in the demographic transition has been questioned in the recent debate (Galor,
2012). Indeed, theory clearly states that if parents appreciate surviving children, when mortality
declines they reduce the number of births, leaving desired fertility unchanged. This could not
be the case if survival were uncertain and parents had a precautionary demand for children. The
evidence on the relevance of this theoretical hypothesis seems quite scant (Doepke (2005); Galor
(2012)). In the context of this paper, the endogeneity ofmortality would add to those of financial
variables and per capitaGDP,making the econometric analysis really hard. This is themain reason
why we choose to approximate net fertility with the net reproduction rate (NRR). According to
the definition of the United Nations, NRR is: ”The average number of daughters a hypothetical
cohort of women would have at the end of their reproductive period if they were subject during
their whole lives to the fertility rates and the mortality rates of a given period. It is expressed as
number of daughters per woman.” The use of NRR as an alternative to the total fertility rate is
common in the literature and is the choice of Scotese Lehr (2009) and Angeles (2010) among
others.10
In what follows, we assume that the parameters qt+2 and  differ across countries, but stay
constant across time for each country. From the empirical point of view, fertility choice is deeply
intertwined with a large number of economic and social variables. Many of these variables are un-
observable in the publicly available data collectionswhile others are intrinsically non-dimensional,
like those related to deeply rooted mental habits, cultural influences, religious traditions, and the
like. Given that these variables change only slowly, the fixed-effect panel estimator is the elective
method of estimation. Accordingly, we formulate the empirical model:
NRRi;t = 0 + BOR0i;t1 + FIN0i;t2 + X0i;t3 + ui + t + "i;t (9)
where BOR is a vector of variables used to approximate the ease of access to borrowing, FIN is a
vector of variables describing the development of investment opportunities in capital markets, X
is a set of variables which account for the main determinants of fertility, u is a country-specific,
time-unvarying, random variable potentially correlated with the explanatory variables,  is a time
effect, and " is a scalar disturbance term with E["] = 0. The subscript i is for countries, while
t is for time periods. Each time observation is the average of the value of a given variable over
a non-overlapping five-year period. The set of controls X includes per capita GDP, female and
male education, and the rate of urbanisation.11 This set also includes a proxy of the availability
of public pension programmes. Indeed, inmany countries, governments provide elders with pub-
licly funded pensions financed through a pay-as-you-go system. This intergenerational transfer
is made up by taxation on youths and a corresponding transfer to elders. Public pension systems
diminish the need to access private financial markets for old age support, resulting at least in a
partial offset of freely-chosen savings. In this context, the inclusion of some measure of public
pensions in eq. (9) could bring about a lower or negligible coefficient for private financialmarkets.
Hence, the observed correlation between financial opportunities and fertility would simply mask
a genuine causal relation running from public pensions to fertility. In our econometric analysis of
cross-country fertility, other important control variables are the public expenditure on children
10Though our theoretical model is developed under the assumption that planned and actual fertility coincide, to allow
for discrepancies between them would be a straightforward mathematical extension. For an example see Azarnert (2006).
11In preliminary estimates the set of controls included the real interest rate, but its parameter was always not significant.
Hence, in the following, we present regression results frommodels excluding the interest rate.
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(CHILDRENEXP) (see, e.g., Borck andWrohlich (2011)) and the share of people who adhere
to Catholic (CATHOLICS) and Islamic (MUSLIMS) religions. Data on these variables refer to
one time period only, and we use them in random effects IV estimates.
The hypothesis that financial variables are endogenous to the NRR is of paramount impor-
tance inmodel estimation. Indeed, the rate of population changemodifies the age structurewhich
is one of the determinants of the allocation of assets in the life cycle. Age affects household port-
folio choice trough influence on the degree of risk aversion. If household preferences change over
time then the birth year could have similar consequences on financial decisions.
Instrumental variable methods allow unbiased parameter estimates when variables strongly
correlated with the endogenous variables and uncorrelated with the model error are used as in-
struments. We instrument the variables approximating for credit and financial investment with
the Index of Financial Liberalisation (FINREFORM) produced at IMF (Abiad et al., 2009) . The
recent history of the financial sector in developed and developing countries highlights the impor-
tance of state intervention until a diffused process of liberalisation and deregulation took place
starting from the early 1980s. Previously, the state had an important role in the ownership of
banks and the allocation of credit was strongly regulated. Entry barriers restricted the supply of
financial services and limited competition. Liberalisation of financial markets was the outcome
of policy reforms implemented by governments in many countries. Often, those reforms were
caused by events like economic crises, the formation of a new government, and the intervention
of international financial institutions (Abiad and Mody, 2005). Hence, financial liberalisation
can be considered exogenous to the choice of fertility.
The process of financial liberalisation can be interpreted in a political economy framework
where a policy reform can be favoured by some interest groups which face the opposition of other
groups who gain more in the status quo (Burgoon et al., 2012). In this context, the quality of
political institutions affects the likelihood of reforms in financialmarkets. In the same framework,
Rajan and Zingales (2003) show that the opposition to financial liberalisation can be weakened
by openness to trade and to capital flows. We agree with Rajan and Zingales and use the ratio
between foreign trade and GDP (TRADE) as an instrumental variable for credit constraints and
access to financial investment.
The econometric model allows for the likely endogeneity of per capita GDP as a consequence
of reverse causality from the dynamics of population to economic growth. Hence, we add to the
set of IVs the inflation rate (INFLATION),the index of investment freedom (INVESTFREE-
DOM) of the Heritage Foundation and the ratio of foreign trade to GDP.The first variable cap-
tures the impact of monetary policy on the economy, while openness is one of the main deter-
minants of economic growth, as well as the constraints to private investment. We also expect
significant effects of FINREFORM on GDP per capita because they are well documented in the
literature.
4.2 Data description
The dependent variable in our regressions is the net reproduction rate which we take from the
United Nations, World Population Prospects 2010.
The econometric model includes the main determinants of fertility (e.g., Ehrlich and Kim
(2007); Schultz (1997)). Five variables approximate for the system of incentives faced by house-
holds in the choice of fertility. Data on the GDP per capita in 2005 purchasing parity units
(GDP) come from the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2010 (WDI). The average
years of schooling of women (SCHOOLINGFEM) and the average years of schooling of men
(SCHOOLINGMAL), both aged 15 and over, are from the dataset of Barro and Lee (2010).
As a proxy of public pensions we consider the ratio of public social protection (excluding health)
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expenditure to GDP (SSECURITY).12 The source of these data is the IMF and they are avail-
able at the site of the International Labour Office for the years 1995-2007. We also include in
some specifications the variable CHILDRENEXP. This variable accounts for the public social
protection expenditure on benefits for children as a percentage of GDP. Data are released by the
ILO for the years from 2008 to 2011. Given the sparse nature of this variable, in the estimates
we consider this variable time unvarying and apply random effects panel methods. The social and
economic characteristics of the environment relevant to reproduction are approximated by the
rate of urbanisation (URBAN), drawn from the World Bank, WDI 2010, and by the variables
CATHOLICS andMUSLIMS that refer to the year 2000 and are from Barro (2003).
Access to financial markets is approximated by three variables. Following the literature on
other household choices (e.g., savings and education, Loayza et al. (2000); De Gregorio (1996)),
we use the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (PRIVCRED) as a proxy for
borrowing constraints. Data on this variable come from the FinancialDevelopment and Structure
Database of the World Bank Research Department (Beck et al. (2000)). While private credit
includes credit to the business sector, Beck et al. (2012) provide the ratio of household credit
(HOUSECRED) toGDP for 45 countries averaged over the years 1994-2005. We use this better
proxy for access to credit as a robustness check of our regression results.
To capture the degree of development of the other side of capital markets, namely financial
investment, we use data on one of the most popular forms of investment: public bonds. Indeed,
often countries where financial markets find the minimal conditions for their existence see the
significant presence of assets issued by the public administration, as shown by Beck et al. (2010).
Actually, the supply of public bonds is favoured by the considerable size of state assets in every
modern economy and the consequent low risk of defaultwhich attracts awide public of risk-averse
savers. The sustained and widespread growth of public expenditure worldwide after World War
II was another major reason for the increase in the share of public bonds on financial markets.
However, public bonds can also be sold to foreign institutions. Hence, external public debt can-
not be used to approximate the range of financial investment opportunities available to domestic
households. We use the data fromPanizza (2008) to obtain the ratio of domestic public debt held
by residents to GDP (DEBT) for more than 100 countries in the years from 1990 to 2007.
The following variables are used as instruments. The Index of Financial Liberalisation (FIN-
REFORM) is constructed by Abiad et al. (2009) as the sum of seven components measuring re-
forms in credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state own-
ership, policies on securities markets, banking regulations and restrictions on the capital account.
Data refer to 91 countries over the period 1973–2005. INVESTFREEDOM is one of the com-
ponents of the Index of Economic Freedom produced byTheHeritage Foundation. The set of IV
is completed by two variables drawn fromWDI: the inflation rate, and the ratio of foreign trade
to GDP.
The dependent variable NRR and all the explanatory variables but SSECURITY, are ex-
pressed in logarithms.
The sources and description of the data of each variable are reported in table 1, while basic
statistics and a correlationmatrix are reported in table 2. The reported figures are for the complete
sample, while the various subsamples used for estimation are made up of observations for which
the whole set of variables – dependent and independent – are non-missing. Accordingly, each
estimation table reports the number of countries and the number of observations included in the
calculation.
12For a comprehensive survey on the economic and political factors shaping modern social security systems see Galasso
and Profeta (2002).
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4.3 Econometric Methods and Results
Themodel is estimated under different specifications and with different methods. Specifications
start from the basic equation, to which we add PRIVCRED and DEBT. We estimate a panel
fixed effects model using OLS and two IV methods: two-step Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) andLimited InformationMaximumLikelihood (LIML).OLS,GMMandLIML adopt
clustered by country robust estimators of the standard errors of the model.13
Table 4 presents theOLSfixed effects estimates of severalmodels. Among themost important
determinants of the net reproduction rate we find the ratio of private credit to GDP that shows a
significant positive effect with an elasticity of 15%. The variables DEBT and SSECURITY have
significant parameter estimates with a negative sign as expected. The estimate of the elasticity of
NRR to DEBT is 5:1%.
The endogeneity of per capita GDP and the financial variables is addressed with IV estimates
presented in Table 5. GMM provides efficient parameter estimates – i.e., with minimum asymp-
totic variance – under general heteroskedasticity. The LIML estimator is a useful alternative be-
cause it is more robust to the presence of weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005), although it
assumes i.i.d. errors. Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of the same specifications of Table
4 with GMM and LIML. Table 6 provides a large set of statistics useful for the evaluation of IV
estimates. The results of the first-stage regression for the model with PRIVCRED and the model
with DEBT are in Table 7.
In the IV regression results, the basic model of fertility is confirmed and reinforced. Indeed,
almost in every specification the schooling variables and the rate of urbanisation show significant
and sizeable parameters. Per capita GDP confirms the minor role it displays in OLS estimates,
which is not peculiar to this paper. The model which includes PRIVCRED among regressors is
estimated with GMM and LIML using INFLATION, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVEST-
FREEDOM as instruments for the endogenous variables per capita GDP and PRIVCRED. It is
worth noting the small difference of GMMwith respect to LIML parameter estimates, notwith-
standing the lack of robustness to heteroskedasticity of the latter estimation method. The param-
eter of PRIVCRED is still significant and positive, showing a value around 0.32, greater than the
OLS estimate. The positive effect of instrumenting PRIVCRED on its parameter estimate can
be explained as the effect of measurement error due to the statistical content of the variable that
includes not just credit to households, but credit to the business sector too. Instrumental vari-
ables may correct the attenuation effect in OLS estimates. In the following we will present the
estimation results of a model that includes a measure of credit to households.
The results of the IV estimation of the effect of access to financial investment on net fertil-
ity are presented in Table 5. The set of instruments for GDP and DEBT includes the variables:
INFLATION, INFLATION squared, TRADE, and FINREFORM. The addition of the ratio
of domestic public debt to GDP to the basic model provides a test of the theory in section 3. In-
deed, IV estimates confirm the results of OLS regressions which maintain that greater opportu-
nities of financial investment reduce the desired number of children. The joint significance of the
parameters of PRIVCRED and DEBT provides support to one of the main results of the theory
thatmaintains borrowing constraints and access to financial investment have quite distinct effects
on household behaviour and fertility. When the model includes both DEBT and PRIVCRED,
the estimated elasticity of DEBT amounts to around  13%, while the same elasticity remains
close to 30% for PRIVCRED. The model in the last column of Table 5 displays the results of
the estimates with the inclusion of the controls CHILDRENEXP, CATHOLICS, MUSLIMS
and a dummy variable for high-income OECD countries to the set of explanatory variables. Be-
cause these variables do not vary over time, we apply the two-stage least-squares error-components
13The computation was conducted using the STATA command xtivreg2 (Baum et al., 2003).
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model (EC2SLS) proposed by Baltagi (1981). The main results of model estimation remain ro-
bust after the enlargement of the set of explanatory variables.
The reliability of the results of IV estimation depends on several hypotheses which underlie
the use of GMM and LIML methods. Table 6 presents the statistics of some tests of the general
specification and the quality of instrumental variables. The Sargan-Hansen J statistic is a general
test of specification that under the null maintains the validity of the overidentifying restrictions.
In the case of EC2SLS, this statistic also tests the hypothesis of random effects. The values of the J
statistic inTable 6 show that the specifications cannot be rejected. Furthermore, a recent strand of
the econometric literature highlights the risks involved in the use of excluded instrument which
are not strongly correlated with the endogenous variables. Underidentification of an endogenous
variable can be tested by the Angrist-Pischke chi-squared statistic (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
The values of the statistic we obtain are clearly against the null of underidentification of each of
the three endogenous variables.
The Angrist-Pischke F statistic allows a test of weak identification. This phenomenon arises
when the correlation between the endogenous variable and its instruments is not zero but small.
Critical values for this test are not available. One possibility is the use of the Stock-Yogo (Stock
and Yogo, 2005) critical values for the Cragg-Donald F statistic with one endogenous regressor.
The null hypothesis is that a given group of instruments is weak against the alternative that it is
strong, under two definitions of weak instruments: instruments are weak if the bias of the IV esti-
mator, relative to the bias of OLS, could exceed a certain threshold b; instruments are weak if the
conventional-levelWald test based on IV statistics has an actual size that could exceed a certain
threshold r. Interestingly, Stock-Yogo critical values for LIML estimates are lower than those for
GMM, reflecting greater robustness of the former method to the presence of weak instruments.
Applying the test to the endogenous variables in Table 6, we find strong rejection of the null with
respect toGDP, while PRIVCRED andDEBT often lead to the rejection of the weak IV hypoth-
esis. In this respect, Table 6 displays the estimates of the Anderson-Rubin (Anderson and Rubin,
1949) test statistic that is robust to the use of weak instruments. The null hypothesis maintains
the coefficients of the endogenous regressors are jointly equal to zero. The estimated values in
Table 6 show that in most of the specifications the null cannot be accepted. The relevance of the
instruments we use in estimates can be further appreciated with a glance at Table 7 that presents
the first stage estimation results. In particular, FINREFORM and other IVs enter the equations
with significant parameters, as expected.
One question which arises from the use of PRIVCRED as a proxy for household borrow-
ing constraints is the inclusion of credit channelled to the business sector. Although both com-
ponents of private credit probably display similar temporal trends and high cross-country cor-
relation, the robustness of the results we obtained should be assessed through the use of data
specific to household credit. In this regard, we consider data on household credit (HOUSE-
CRED) available for a cross-section of 44 countries over the period 1994-2005. Here, we ap-
ply again EC2SLS methods. The results are in table 8. We estimate four models which include
HOUSECREDamong regressors. The differences depend on the inclusion ofDEBT andCHIL-
DRENEXP among explanatory variables with effects on the number of countries in the sample.
When the endogenous variables are GDP and HOUSECRED the instruments are: INFLA-
TION, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM. To estimate models that assume
GDP, HOUSECREDIT, and DEBT are endogenous variables we use INFLATION, INFLA-
TION squared, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM as IVs. The parameter of
HOUSECRED is again positive and precisely estimated, displaying an elasticity with respect to
NRR in the range 20-30%. Hence, the use of a better proxy for household credit provides a more
realistic estimate of the effect of borrowing constraints on fertility. We also provide a further test
of the robustness of our results to model specification with the estimation of an equation that in-
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cludes the share of government consumption in GDP (SHAREGOVCONS). Indeed, although
our estimates take several forms of government intervention into account, some could be miss-
ing and they could be approximated by SHAREGOVCONS. Data on SHAREGOVCONS are
from Penn World Tables 8.0. The results of GMM and LIML within panel estimates are shown
in the last two columns of table 8. The inclusion of SHAREGOVCONS is justified and the over-
all results are significantly confirmed. More in general, table 8 shows how DEBT enters all the
specifications with significant parameter estimates close to 0:10.
The complete econometric exercise not only highlights the importance of financial develop-
ment for the choice of thenumber of children, but it also clarifies that the positive effect of released
borrowing constraints exceeds the negative one due to more extensive access to capital markets.
Hence, financial development does seem responsible for a check on the declining trend of fertility
worldwide.
4.4 Quantile regression
The picture obtained by the preceding set of estimations provides evidence that financial devel-
opment, proxied by PRIVCRED and DEBT, does play a role in the determination of fertility.
Nonetheless, it may be of interest to check the robustness of our estimates to outliers and whether
the size of the estimated effects carries over the whole distribution of fertility; this is also moti-
vated by the prior that countries with high levels of fertility (typically those of the Sub-Saharan
area)may react differently than those which already have transitioned to permanently low fertility
because of unobserved variables. To address this issue, we employ a quantile regression estimator
(Koenker, 2005) on our panel of countries and account for the fixed effect component using the
two-step method suggested by Fitzenberger (2012):
1. we regress the net reproduction rate on the standard set of regressors, including two dum-
mies for temporal effects, using a FE-OLS estimator; next, we subtract from the net repro-
duction rate the estimated fixed effect;
2. we perform quantile regressions of the resulting variable on the standard set of regressors.
Finally, we bootstrap standard errors. The results for this exercise are displayed in table 9 and sub-
stantially corroborate the previous econometric analysis based on conditional mean functions.
The evidence suggests that, with the exception of URBAN, SSECURITY, and DEBT, all regres-
sors show a substantial degree of heterogeneity across the fertility spectrum. More specifically,
women’s and men’s schooling vary across quantiles without following any definite trend, while
PRIVCRED and GDP follow a detectable pattern. The positive effect of PRIVCRED on fertil-
ity is relatively low (0:111) for the first percentiles – the countries with low fertility – whereas it
doubles (0.217) at top fertility percentile. This result shows a very peculiar type of unintended
consequences of financial development: interestingly, high fertility countries may see their fertil-
ity problems affected by financial opportunities more than low fertility countries.
More generally, we find that the gradient of the effect of GDP is increasing across quantiles,
going from 0:041 to a negligible  0:004 (p = 0:749): this suggests that the negative role of
income on fertility is larger in countries with very low fertility, whereas this effect is very small
in countries with very high fertility, probably because of the low degree of substitution between
home- and market-produced goods and opportunities. In sum, the quantile regression approach
suggests that the commonly observednegative relationbetween fertility and income is highly non-
linear and mediated by financial markets.
15
5 Final remarks
The objective of this paper was to investigate the role of financial market imperfections in deter-
mining fertility using international panel data. Our results appear useful to interpret the main
trends observed in fertility in the world in recent years: the declining number of children per
woman is fundamentally caused by growing income and human capital and wider female partic-
ipation in the labour force. During this period, households’ indebtedness is known (Harvey,
2004) to have sharply increased while financial markets further developed with a burst of innova-
tion. According to our estimates, the development of financial markets has positively influenced
the fertility rate. Indeed, household behaviour has led to a significant shift of resources in the
life cycle from the later stages of adulthood to the earlier ones. Greater debt has brought about
an incentive to invest in children to compensate for the negative effects on old-age consumption.
Broader access to financial investment has had an important income effect (negative) on fertility
choice of young adults. Hence, financial development exercised significant influence on the fertil-
ity choice of households but in two opposite directions. In this respect, our paper highlights the
powerful connections between financial markets and fertility choices, substantially overlooked in
the existing literature, with an aggregate cross-country perspective.
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6 Tables
TABLE 1
Description of variables
Availability
Variable Description/Source From Until
NRR Log of net reproduction rate: number of children born to an average woman over her re-
productive years
1995 2010
United Nations (2010)
GDP Log of per capita gross domestic product (2005’s PPP units) 1995 2010
URBAN Log of urbanization rate 1995 2010
INFLATION Inflation rate, consumer prices (annual percent change) 1995 2010
TRADE Foreign trade (percentage of GDP) 1995 2010
TheWorld Bank (2010), World Development Indicators
SCHOOLINGFEM Log of average years of schooling of women aged 15 and over 1995 2010
SCHOOLINGMAL Log of average years of schooling of men aged 15 and over 1995 2010
Barro and Lee (2010)
CATHOLICS Percentage of catholics in the population 2000 2000
MUSLIMS Percentage of muslims in the population 2000 2000
Barro (2003)
PRIVCRED Log of total private credit by deposit money banks to GDP, deflated 1995 2010
Beck et al. (2000)
DEBT Log of public sector’s domestic debt to GDP 1995 2007
Panizza (2008)
SSECURITY Social security payments to GDP 1995 2010
CHILDRENEXP Children expenditure to GDP 1995 2010
ILO,The Social Security Expenditure Database
SHAREGOVCONS Log of share of government consumption at current PPPsc 1995 2005
PennWorld Table, version 8.0
FINREFORM Index of financial reforms 1995 2005
Abiad et al. (2009)
HOUSECRED Log of total outstanding claims of deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP Average 1994–2005
Beck et al. (2012)
INVESTFREEDOM Freedom of investment 1995 2010
Heritage Foundation (2012)
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TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics
Quartiles
Variable N Mean  Min Max 25% 50% 75%
NRR 574 0.19 0.43 -0.90 1.04 -0.16 0.18 0.59
GDP 529 8.60 1.27 5.62 11.26 7.57 8.65 9.61
URBAN 606 3.89 0.53 2.03 4.61 3.55 4.03 4.30
INFLATION 494 0.08 0.11 -0.37 0.99 0.03 0.05 0.08
TRADE 539 90.24 49.96 0.67 422.02 56.68 80.05 112.27
SCHOOLINGFEM 432 2.05 0.44 0.51 2.62 1.82 2.19 2.36
SCHOOLINGMAL 432 1.97 0.43 0.05 2.55 1.77 2.09 2.27
CATHOLICS 342 0.30 0.33 0.00 0.94 0.01 0.11 0.58
MUSLIMS 342 0.25 0.36 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.04 0.39
PRIVCRED 459 0.33 0.25 0.02 1.31 0.13 0.27 0.48
DEBT 337 2.80 1.02 0.00 4.80 2.18 2.95 3.56
SSECURITY 217 9.54 6.85 0.01 24.32 3.20 9.26 15.58
CHILDRENEXP 264 0.97 1.07 0.00 4.15 0.13 0.54 1.46
SHAREGOVCONS 501 0.20 0.11 -0.00 0.78 0.13 0.17 0.25
FINREFORM 270 13.74 4.77 0.81 21.00 10.40 14.10 17.60
HOUSECRED 135 0.28 0.24 0.03 0.99 0.08 0.18 0.42
INVESTFREEDOM 496 51.33 18.91 10.00 90.00 35.00 50.00 70.00
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TABLE 4
Fixed effects estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0:075 0:003 0:114 0:019
(1:142) (0:035) (1:547) (0:210)
SCHOOLINGFEM  0:703  0:546  1:044  0:837
( 0:809) ( 0:633) ( 1:124) ( 0:935)
SCHOOLINGMAL 0:454 0:379 0:917 0:774
(0:490) (0:416) (0:914) (0:802)
URBAN  0:464**  0:512**  0:260  0:255
( 2:370) ( 2:275) ( 1:219) ( 1:057)
SSECURITY  0:007  0:008  0:010**  0:012***
( 1:373) ( 1:453) ( 2:298) ( 2:831)
PRIVCRED 0:146** 0:148**
(2:435) (2:007)
DEBT  0:051**  0:044
( 2:233) ( 1:578)
Statistics
Observations 201 195 158 152
Countries 78 76 70 68
R2 Within 0:319 0:381 0:433 0:497
F test prob. for time dummies 0:000 0:000 0:001 0:001
Notes   Dependent variable: Log of net reproduction rate. Temporal dummies are included.
Country-clustered Student’s t in parentheses. Statistical significance asterisks: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***
= 1%.
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TABLE 8
Robustness check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0:034  0:023 0:046  0:008  0:384**  0:451**
(0:371) ( 0:252) (0:491) ( 0:080) ( 2:342) ( 2:330)
HOUSECREDIT 0:266*** 0:198** 0:305*** 0:226*
(3:133) (2:089) (3:269) (1:764)
SCHOOLINGFEM  1:095  1:293  1:279  0:884  3:490***  3:644***
( 1:221) ( 1:248) ( 0:850) ( 0:509) ( 3:249) ( 3:165)
SCHOOLINGMAL 0:812 0:931 1:095 0:450 3:731*** 3:946***
(0:911) (0:834) (0:728) (0:254) (3:201) (3:138)
URBAN  0:369*  0:258  0:569**  0:420*  0:490*  0:467
( 1:760) ( 1:211) ( 2:325) ( 1:680) ( 1:717) ( 1:536)
SSECURITY  0:004  0:007*  0:001  0:006  0:003  0:003
( 0:824) ( 1:737) ( 0:176) ( 0:809) ( 0:534) ( 0:374)
DEBT  0:067**  0:096**  0:105***  0:108***
( 2:029) ( 2:075) ( 2:839) ( 2:612)
CHILDRENEXP 0:008 0:012
(0:164) (0:218)
PRIVCRED 0:368* 0:445*
(1:909) (1:924)
SHAREGOVCONS  0:384*  0:426*
( 1:857) ( 1:886)
Statistics
Observations 106 81 94 69 108 108
Countries 41 37 35 31 44 44
R2 0:445 0:475 0:446 0:543 0:373 0:296
Hansen J
Statistic 12:697 7:153 14:878 13:928 3:040 2:885
p-value 0:391 0:894 0:248 0:379 0:219 0:236
Notes   Dependent variable: Log of net reproduction rate. Bootstrapped Student’s t in parentheses.
Models 1   4 are estimated with EC2SLS, model 5 with GMM, model 6 with LIML. Models 1 and 3 in-
clude as instruments forGDPandHOUSECREDIT: INFLATION,TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVEST-
FREEDOM.Models 2 and 4 include as instruments for GDP, HOUSECREDIT, and DEBT: INFLATION,
INFLATION2, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM. Model 5 and 6 include as instruments
for GDP, PRIVCRED, and DEBT: INFLATION, INFLATION2, Log of TRADE, FINREFORM, and IN-
VESTFREEDOM. Temporal and regional dummies included. Statistical significance asterisks: * = 10%, **
= 5%, *** = 1%.
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TABLE 9
Quantile regressions
Quantiles of the distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
SCHOOLINGFEM  0:914***  0:795***  0:839***  0:841***  0:698***
( 6:323) ( 7:603) ( 8:002) ( 5:889) ( 4:106)
SCHOOLINGMAL 0:765*** 0:695*** 0:775*** 0:812*** 0:664***
(5:014) (6:303) (7:006) (5:394) (3:704)
URBAN  0:259***  0:261***  0:255***  0:249***  0:261***
( 16:351) ( 22:791) ( 22:253) ( 15:938) ( 14:026)
SSECURITY  0:011***  0:012***  0:012***  0:012***  0:011***
( 11:382) ( 17:010) ( 16:497) ( 11:773) ( 9:263)
GDP 0:041*** 0:031*** 0:019** 0:006  0:004
(3:684) (3:888) (2:400) (0:533) ( 0:321)
DEBT  0:047***  0:044***  0:044***  0:040***  0:043***
( 7:488) ( 9:703) ( 9:676) ( 6:427) ( 5:832)
PRIVCRED 0:111*** 0:137*** 0:148*** 0:150*** 0:217***
(3:783) (6:410) (6:937) (5:172) (6:278)
Notes Dependent variable: Log of net reproduction rate. Bootstrapped Student’s t in parenthe-
ses. Temporal dummies included, country-specific fixed effects partialled out. Each column reports
regression coefficients for the given percentile of the dependent variable’s distribution. Statistical
significance asterisks: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
Appendix
A Comparative statics results
The case of no frictions
Let us consider the young adult optimization program under the assumption of perfect
financial markets:
max
c1t ;nt;c
2
t+1;c
3
t+1;c
3
t+2
v
 
c1t ; nt

+ u
 
c2t+1; c
3
t+1

+ g
 
c3t+2

sub (1  nt)w1t +
w2t+1
Rt+1
+
ntqt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
st
nt 1
+
 

c1t +
c2t+1
Rt+1
+
c3t+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
c3t+1
nt 1Rt+1

= 0:
Optimization provides the first-order conditions:
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+ u
qt+2
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= 0 (11)
@Lu
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= 0 (12)
@Lu
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@Lu
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  u
Rt+1Rt+2
= 0 (14)
@Lu
@u
=(1  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Rt+1
+
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+
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+
 

c1t +
c2t+1
Rt+1
+
c3t+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
c3t+1
nt 1Rt+1

= 0;
(15)
where u is the Lagrange multiplier. Let us consider the comparative statics effect of life-
cycle wages on fertility, (16):
dnt =
1

8>><>>:

@v
@c1t
22dw
1
t

| {z }
Cost of children
 

62 (1  nt) dw1t +
62
Rt+1
dw2t+1

| {z }
Income effect
9>>=>>; (16)
where andij denote the determinant and the (i; j)-th cofactor of the borderedHes-
sianmatrix of the problem, obtained deriving the first order conditions with regard to c1t ,
nt, c2t+1, c3t+1, c3t+2, and u. The second-order conditions for utility maximization imply
that < 0 and22 > 0. Hence, the sign of the income effect depends on62, whose
expression is:
62 =  @
2g
@
 
c3t+2
2
"
@2u
@
 
c2t+1
2 @2u
@
 
c3t+1
2    @u@c2t+1@c3t+1
2#



@v
@c1t@nt
  w1t
@2v
@ (c1t )
2

  qt+2
Rt+1Rt+2

:
(17)
The strict concavity of the utility functions u() and g() implies that the sign of62
depends on the sign of the expression in brackets on the second line of (17), which is
made of the difference of two terms. The one in parentheses is positive when children
are normal goods in the maximization of v (c1t ; nt). The term qt+2 (Rt+1Rt+2)
 1 refers
to the negative effect on fertility of larger wealth because parents have more resources to
fund their old-age consumption. Hence, we detect three channels of influence of income
upon fertility: two are negative, one is positive. The comparative-statics effect of the gift
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qt+2 on nt is given by:
dnt
dqt+2
=   
 1
Rt+1Rt+2

@v
@c1t
22 + nt62

: (18)
The change in the number of children due to a change in the interest rate, assuming that
Rt = Rt+1 = R, is given by
dnt
dR
=
1
R
8>><>>:
u
R

2qt+222
R
 32   42
nt 1
  252
R

| {z }
Substitution effect
+62

Dt   st+1
R

| {z }
Financial position
9>>=>>; :
Given the sign of the cofactor62, the discussion of the effects of qt+2 andR on nt
follows along the lines of section (3.2).
Themodel with borrowing constraints
Under the assumption of binding borrowing constraints the utility maximization pro-
gram becomes:
max
c1t ;nt;c
2
t+1;c
3
t+1;c
3
t+2
v
 
c1t ; nt

+ u
 
c2t+1; c
3
t+1

+ g
 
c3t+2

sub (a) (1  nt)w1t +
w2t+1
Rt+1
+
ntqt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
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+
 
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c1t +
c2t+1
Rt+1
+
c3t+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
c3t+1
nt 1Rt+1

= 0
(b) c1t = (1  nt)w1t +Dt;
By differencing the first order conditions, we obtain the comparative statics effects of the
exogenous variables on nt.
Higher credit availability will impact on household fertility according to the follow-
ing expression:
dnt
dDt
=
 11
 

w1t
@2v
@ (c1t )
2  
@v
@c1tnt

+
 51
 
; (19)
where   and  ij denote the determinant and the (i; j)-th cofactor of the bordered Hes-
sian matrix of the problem. In this case,   > 0 and  11 < 0 are required for the
maximization problem to reach an optimal solution, while it can be easily verified that
 51 > 0:
 51 =   qt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
"
@2u
@
 
c2t+1
2 @2u
@
 
c3t+1
2    @u@c2t+1@c3t+1
2#
@2g
@
 
c3t+2
2 > 0:
(20)
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Themodel with saving constraints
Now we analyze the model of household choice by assuming that the optimal desired
value of saving st+1 is higher than the ceiling st+1. Accordingly, the maximization pro-
gram becomes:
max
c1t ;nt;c
2
t+1;c
3
t+1;c
3
t+2
v
 
c1t ; nt

+ u
 
c2t+1; c
3
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 
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Rt+1
+
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Rt+1Rt+2
+
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+
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c3t+1
nt 1Rt+1

= 0
(b) c3t+2 = Rt+2st + ntqt+2;
The reaction of a household’s fertility to greater investment opportunities is given by:
dnt
dst+1
=
1

 
52
Rt+1
  qt+2Rt+2 @
2g
@
 
c3t+2
222
!
: (21)
where andij denote the determinant and the (i; j)-th cofactor of the borderedHes-
sian matrix of the problem. Among the second order conditions for a maximum of the
problem we have > 0 and22 < 0. In this expression, the term
 qt+2Rt+2 @
2g
@
 
c3t+2
222 < 0
refers to the trade-off between the investment in children and that in financial activities.
The sign of the term is negative because greater financial investment opportunities reduce
the need to raise children for old age consumption. The other component of the effect of
st+1 on nt has the opposite sign of the income effect of wages, determined by the sign of
52. Below we show that52 is negative:
52 =  
"
@2u
@
 
c2t+1
2 @2u
@
 
c3t+1
2    @u@c2t+1@c3t+1
2#
@v
@c1t@nt
  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@2v
@ (c1t )
2

< 0:
(22)
Hence, fertility will decrease with st+1.
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